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Court held that the law singled out profits earned from an expressive activity, a burden the State placed on no other income, and it
was directed solely at works with a particular content. In order to
be consistent with the First Amendment, the identity of the
speaker had to be irrelevant in such a case.
The compelling state interest of preventing criminals from
profiting from their crimes and of compensating the victims of
crime may have been valid, but the Son of Sam statute was seen as
overinclusive and overbroad in its remedial effect. There was little
interest in limiting victim compensation to the proceeds of the
criminal's speech about the crime. And, the statute applied to
works on any subject that expressed an author's thoughts or memories about his or her crime. This overly broad definition meant
that the author need not be actually accused or convicted of a
crime, but need only mention that a crime was committed in his or
her work. The Court feared that if the statute was permitted to
stand, a broad range of literature (including many classics) would
be subjected to the law's requirements.
Justice Blackmun, in his one paragraph concurrence, stated
that the New York Statute was underinclusive as well as overinclusive. Justice Kennedy's concurrence argued that there was no need
to look at compelling state interests because the Son of Sam statute could be reversed using solely First Amendment restricted content of speech analysis.
-C.L.
v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, No. 911666, U.S. App. LEXIS 25790 (7TH CIR. OCT. 13, 1992).

BANKS

Braxston Lee Banks played three years of collegiate football at
the University of Notre Dame. Due to knee injuries, he was unable
to play football during portions of his sophomore and junior years.
Fearing that another season of college football might exacerbate
his knee injury and prevent him from playing in the National
Football League (NFL), he sat out his last year of collegiate eligibility and entered the 1990 NFL draft. Unfortunately, Banks failed
to be selected in the draft or as a free agent. In an effort to improve his marketability as a professional football player, Banks returned to the University of Notre Dame to re-enter its football
program and play his last year of collegiate eligibility. The application of two National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) eligibility rules, however, barred his participation in college football;
Rule 12.2.4.2, the "no-draft" rule, which provides that an amateur
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loses eligible status when he asks to be placed on the draft list of a
professional sport, and Rule 12.3.1, the "no-agent" rule, which provides that an amateur is ineligible to participate in intercollegiate
sports if he or she has ever asked to be represented by an agent for
the purpose of marketing that amateur in that sport. Since Banks
participated in the 1990 NFL draft and had asked to be represented by an agent prior to the draft, the application of either of
the two rules would sufficiently bar him from taking advantage of
his final year of eligibility.
Banks filed and amended a complaint requesting that the
NCAA be permanently enjoined from enforcing the no-draft and
no-agent rules and seeking treble damages from the NCAA for
losses stemming from the NCAA's bar of Banks from intercollegiate sports. The 7th Circuit addressed three issues: (1) whether
Banks had standing as representative for the class action seeking
to permanently enjoin the NCAA's enforcement of the no-draft
and no-agent rules, (2) whether the lower court erred in dismissing
Banks' antitrust claim under Rule 12(b) (6), and (3) whether Banks
stated a valid claim in his antitrust suit for treble damages.
First, because Banks' ineligibility to take part in college football prevented him from having a personal stake in the question of
whether the NCAA should be enjoined from enforcing its no-draft
and no-agent rules, the 7th Circuit held that Banks did not have
standing to bring a class action. The court proclaimed that had
Banks filed suit immediately after realizing that he had not been
chosen in the draft or as a free agent, he might have had a stronger
argument for representing the class, even lacking a personal stake
in the outcome. As such, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
class action claim, and held that the district court should have dismissed the class action claim for injunctive relief.
Second, since Banks failed to allege anti-competitive effects in
support of the anti-trust claim in the district court, the lower court
was justified in dismissing his claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Banks
argued that because the record below was not thoroughly developed, it was not appropriate for the lower court to dismiss his
claim. Banks' assertion was that the lower court's dismissal was
not based on Banks' failure to allege anti-competitive effects, thus
evading a 12(b)(6) motion, but rather was improperly decided on
the opinion that the NCAA's no-draft and no-agent rules were procompetitive and reasonable. Banks' argument was unpersuasive
and immediately dismissed.
Third, because Banks' antitrust claim was properly dismissed,
the appellate court failed to see how Banks could expect a reversal
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol9/iss2/8
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of the lower court's judgment without assigning error to its judgment. Irrespective of this, the 7th Circuit ruled that the NCAA's
no-draft and no-agency rules were, in fact, reasonable. The rules
were not terms of employment, nor did they force college football
players to sell their services which would possibly have supported
Banks' anti-competitive proposition. The Court pronounced that
the respective rules served to maintain the distinction between amateur athletes and professional athletes.
-E.A.
LAKELAND LOUNGE OF JACKSON, INC. V. CITY OF JACKSON,

1255

(5TH CIR.

973 F.2D

1992).

The City of Jackson, Mississippi appealed from a ruling by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The ruling declared unconstitutional an amendment to a
zoning ordinance restricting adult businesses to areas zoned for
light industrial use and, with a use permit, to some areas in the
central business district. The ordinance also restricted adult establishments from being within 250 feet of each other or within 1,000
feet of any residentially zoned property, church, school, park, or
playground. The court permanently enjoined the enforcement of
the ordinance.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that such an-ordinance presumptively violates the First Amendment if it was "enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of its content," and that it must be "designed to serve a substantial
government interest" and "may not unreasonably limit alternative
avenues of communication." In establishing that a substantial government interest is served, the court held that the bad "secondary
effects" of adult entertainment, such as a decrease in property values, increased crime, the movement of businesses elsewhere, and
neighborhood blight, were properly relied upon by the city council
when it drafted the ordinance. The court also held that the language of the amended ordinance indicated the council's concern
with secondary effects.
The court further stated that any regulation must provide reasonable alternative avenues of communication for the protected expression. It held that a substantial number of potential sites exist
as alternative locations for adult businesses. In finding that the
Jackson City Council properly considered the secondary effects of
adult business and provided sufficient alternative avenues of expression for them, the circuit court held that the amended ordiPublished by Institutional Repository, 1992
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